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LEGAL ETHICS MUST BE THE HEART OF THE
LAW SCHOOL CURRICULUM
Russell G. Pearce*
Despite what seems to be far greater attention paid to the teaching of
legal ethics than to any other law school subject,' legal ethics remains no
better than a second class subject in the eyes of students and faculty.2
This essay suggests that all efforts at innovation in legal ethics teaching
are doomed to a marginal impact at best. Only recognition that legal eth-
ics is the most important subject in the law school curriculum3 will lead
to real and significant changes in the teaching of legal ethics.
If the commitment of the legal profession and of legal academia to
producing ethical lawyers4 is genuine, legal ethics must be the most im-
portant subject in the curriculum. Properly taught, ethics courses should
provide the lens through which students view what it means to be a law-
yer and discover how to find meaning in their work. From a pragmatic
perspective as well, legal ethics is the only subject in law school "which
every student [who becomes a lawyer] will encounter in practice."6 This
recognition of the significance of teaching legal ethics would require far-
reaching revision of the law school curriculum.
First, in contrast to most law schools where legal ethics is an upper
* Professor of Law and Co-Director of the Louis Stein Center for Law and Ethics, Fordham
University School of Law.
I. For examples of the voluminous literature devoted to the topic, see the articles on Rethink-
ing the Teaching of Legal Ethics in this volume of The Journal of the Legal Profession, which is
based on this past year's Section of Professional Responsibility program at the annual AALS meet-
ing; Teaching Legal Ethics, 58 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. I (Summer/Autumn 1995) (Thomas B.
Metzloff & David B. Wilkins, eds.); and Report of the Professionalism Committee of the ABA
Section of Legal Education and Admissions to the Bar, Teaching and Learning Professionalism
(1996) [hereinafter Teaching and Learning Professionalism].
2. Russell G. Pearce, Teaching Ethics Seriously: Legal Ethics as the Most Important Subject
in Law School, 29 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 719, 724-25 (1998) [hereinafter Pearce, Teaching]. In this
piece, I first developed a number of the themes I discuss in this essay.
3. See generally id.
4. Id. at 721-22 (observing that "[a] fundamental commitment to high ethical standards per-
vades professional rhetoric").
5. Id. at 736 (noting that legal ethics courses "establish[] the foundation for the vital deci-
sions that students will have to make regarding how they will live their lives as lawyers").
6. Id. at 735-36.
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class course sometimes of only two credits,7 legal ethics would have to
be a first year course of at least three credits to make clear to students
and faculty that ethics is a fundamental component of what it means to
think like-and to be-a lawyer.8 While the ethics rules are an essential
aspect of such a course, it cannot resemble "Simon Sez" with an exclu-
sive focus on developing facility with the rules. The rules must be taught
in the context of their purpose and history. They must be placed in the
framework of lawyers' central role in how society distributes justice and
maintains order. This consideration must include both an explanation of
how the doctrine of professionalism provides the basis for lawyers' privi-
lege to practice law and develop ethics rules for themselves, 9 together
with the many critiques of professionalism.' ° It further must explore the
dominant conception of the lawyer as advocate, together with alternative
perspectives on the lawyer's role."
Second, while most law schools today require only one ethics
course,' 2 the curriculum would have to require an advanced course in
legal ethics in the second or third year. 13 An advanced course would
build on what students learned in the first year, emphasize that ethics
remains central throughout their studies, and enable students to integrate
a broad conception of ethics into their assessment of their practice ex-
periences as students and their formation of their self-image as a practi-
tioner in the particular field they will pursue after graduation., 4 One pos-
7. Roger C. Cramton & Susan P. Koniak, Rule. Story. and Commitment in the Teaching of
Legal Ethics, 38 WM. & MARY L. REV. 145, 147 (1996) (noting that "[i]n most law schools today
legal ethics occupies a minor academic role as a one- or two-credit required course in the upper-
class years, often taught by adjuncts or by a rotating group of faculty conscripts"); Teaching and
Learning Professionalism, supra note I, at 40-41 (finding that only 23% of law schools required a
three-credit legal ethics course).
8. Pearce, Teaching, supra note 2, at 736.
9. Russell G. Pearce, The Professionalism Paradigm Shift: Why Discarding Professional
Ideology Will Improve the Conduct and Reputation of the Bar, 70 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1229, 1238-42,
1245 (1995) [hereinafter Pearce, Professionalism].
10. See, e.g., Pearce, Professionalism, supra note 9, at 1276 (advocating rejection of profes-
sionalism); DEBORAH L. RHODE, IN THE INTERESTS OF JUSTICE: REFORMING THE LEGAL
PROFESSION 16-22 (2000) (proposing reform of professionalism).
1I. See, e.g., MONROE H. FREEDMAN, UNDERSTANDING LAWYERS ETHICS (1990) (arguing for
advocacy); Stephen L. Pepper, The Lawyer's Amoral Ethical Role: A Defense, A Problem, and
Some Possibilities, 1986 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 613 (arguing for advocacy); Russell G. Pearce,
Lawyers as America's Governing Class: The Formation and Dissolution of the Original Under-
standing of the American Lawyer's Role, 8 U. CHI. L. SCHOOL ROUNDTABLE 381 (2001) (describ-
ing history of governing class approach); DAVID LUBAN, LAWYERS AND JUSTICE (1988) (urging
moral activist perspective); WILLIAM H. SIMON, THE PRACTICE OF JUSTICE: A THEORY OF
LAWYERS' ETHICS (1,998) (urging moral activist perspective); Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Portia in a
Different Voice: Speculations on a Women's Lawyering Process, I BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 39
(1985) (suggesting a feminist perspective); Russell G. Pearce, The Religious Lawyering Movement:
An Emerging Force In Legal Ethics and Professionalism, 62 FORDHAM L. REV. 1075 (1998) (pro-
viding overview of religious perspectives).
12. See supra note 7.
13. Pearce, Teaching, supra note 2, at 737.
14. Id.
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sible framework for advanced courses is the contextual curriculum of-
fered at Fordham where we have provided students with an opportunity
to take courses such as Ethics in Corporate Practice, Ethics in Criminal
Advocacy, Ethics in Public Interest Law, and Lawyering for Individu-
als. 5
Third, unlike most law schools where the pervasive teaching of legal
ethics is either ignored or given lip service,16 a serious ethics curriculum
would indeed be pervasive. 17 Only this approach will educate students
that ethical issues arise throughout practice and are not limited exclu-
sively to ethics courses. The pervasive method "teaches students the
skills . . . to identify and analyze [ethical questions] in settings where
ethics is not the primary focus of attention."'"
Unfortunately, like all efforts to teach ethics seriously, these sim-
ple-and seemingly self-evident-prescriptions will find a tough audi-
ence among legal academics who cling to assumptions that legal ethics
need not, cannot, and should not be taught.
First, many legal academics believe that legal ethics need not be
taught. This belief has at least two sources. Some believe that conven-
tional legal pedagogy-the Socratic method-is sufficient to build moral
character.19 Others believe in the business-profession distinction inherent
in professionalism. 20 They contrast the self-interest of business people
with lawyers' commitment to the good.' Professionalism controls the
small number of unethical lawyers through an invisible hand of reputa-
tion that rewards ethical practitioners and disciplinary committees that
weed out the truly bad apples.2
Second, many legal academics believe that legal ethics cannot be
taught. They assume that law students are young adults whose values are
"fully formed prior to law school and are not likely to change." 23 Perhaps
the most extreme (and bigoted) expression of this view was the assertion
15. Mary C. Daly et al., Contextualizing Professional Responsibility: A New Curriculum for a
New Century, 58 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 193 (Summer/Autumn 1995). As taught at Fordham,
however, these are introductory ethics courses which seek to combine the advantage of providing
students with the context of a practice area of their interest with an overview of legal ethics. Id. at
199-201.
16.. Deborah L. Rhode, Ethics by the Pervasive Method, 42 J. LEGAL EDUC. 31, 36, 52 (1992).
17. See generally id.
18. Pearce, Teaching, supra note 2, at 737.
19. Id. at 727. See OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, The Use of Law Schools, in 3 THE COLLECTED
WORKS OF JUSTICE HOLMES: COMPLETE PUBLIC WRITINGS AND SELECTED JUDICIAL OPINIONS OF
OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES 474, 475-76 (Sheldon M. Novick ed., 1995); ANTHONY T. KRONMAN,
THE LOST LAWYER: THE FAILING IDEALS OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION 113 (1993).
20. Pearce, Professionalism, supra note 9, at 1238.
21. Id. at 1238-40.
22. Pearce, Teaching, supra note 2, at 726 n.52; Pearce, Professionalism, supra note 9, at
1240, 1245.
23. Pearce, Teaching, supra note 2, at 732.
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by Henry Drinker, the leading legal ethicist of the mid-twentieth century,
that the biggest ethics problem facing the bar was Russian-born Jews
whose disproportionate responsibility for ethical violations resulted from
family upbringings lacking in American values.24 Drinker sought to im-
prove the ethics of the bar by excluding them from admission.25 While
not going as far as Drinker to attribute particular values to specific racial,
ethnic, or religious groups, many academics nonetheless accept Drinker's
assumption that students' values are fully formed before they begin law
school and are not susceptible to change through legal education.26
Third, many legal academics believe that legal ethics should not be
taught. This view dates from the origin of modem legal pedagogy in
Harvard Professor Christopher Columbus Langdell's case method of the
late nineteenth century. At that time, higher education generally shifted
from a moral paradigm to a scientific one. The scientific paradigm dis-
tinguished between facts, which could be taught, and values, which could
not. Ethics was in the realm of values. Langdell similarly adopted a sci-
entific approach. He viewed classroom dissection of appellate cases as
the equivalent of a chemistry laboratory. While most law professors to-
day would probably not believe themselves to be scientists, they continue
to apply the same pedagogical approach as Langdell and to separate legal
from ethical questions. The legal literature is full of stories of students
who raise their hand to question the ethics of a particular legal doctrine
only to be told by their professor that the subject of the class was law,
not ethics.27
These three sources of resistance to teaching ethics should no longer
determine the place of legal ethics in the curriculum. First, the consensus
today is that existing methods of teaching law and of lawyer discipline
do not adequately ensure that lawyers are ethical.28 Second, the current
literature suggests that ethical learning continues into adulthood. 29 But
even if it did not, students would still have to learn in law school how to
24. ROBERT STEVENS, LAW SCHOOL: LEGAL EDUCATION IN AMERICA FROM THE 1850s TO THE
1980s 184 n.41 (1983) (citing 1929 A.B.A. Proc. 622-23).
25. Id. at 176, 184 n.41.
26. Cramton & Koniak, supra note 7, at 146-47 (1996); Ronald M. Pipkin, Law School In-
struction in Professional Responsibility: A Curricular Paradox, 1979 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 247,
265-67; Rhode, Ethics by the Pervasive Method, supra note 16, at 36.
27. David B. Wilkins, Redefining the "Professional" in Professional Ethics: An Interdiscipli-
nary Approach to Teaching Professionalism, 58 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 241, 246 (Sum-
mer/Autumn 1995) (noting that "students who raise general ethical objections in traditional law
school courses are often told that these concerns are irrelevant to the 'legal' issues being dis-
cussed"); WILLIAM STRINGFELLOW, A Lawyer's Work, in WILLIAM STRINGFELLOW, A KEEPER OF
THE WORD 30, 32 (Bill Wylie Kellerman ed., 1994) (recounting that in the 1950s use of the term
justice in the Harvard Law School classroom "evoked ridicule, as ifjustice were a subject beneath
the sophistication of lawyers").
28. Pearce, Teaching, supra note 2, at 728.
29. Id: at 733-35.
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apply their existing ethical framework to the practice of law.3° Third, the
fact-value distinction has come into question3 and ethics "has regained
respect as a serious academic subject" throughout higher education.32
Even the scientific community has rejected the proposition that science
and ethics don't mix.
33
Even though the objections to the serious teaching of ethics lack per-
suasive support, they persist as widely shared assumptions upon which
legal academics unthinkingly rely. Until we confront these assumptions
directly, we will not be able to make the fundamental changes necessary
to move legal ethics from the periphery to the center of legal education.
Incremental changes and teaching innovations alone will have little or no
impact. In the midst of the legal profession's current doldrums, we can-
not afford to do anything less than transform legal education to make
legal ethics the single most important subject.
30. John Mixon & Robert P. Schuwerk, The Personal Dimension of Professional Responsibil-
ity, 58 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 87, 98 (Summer/Autumn 1995).
31. Pearce, Teaching, supra note 2, at 73 1.
32. Id.
33. Id.
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